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Abstract 
A comparative fact can be presented in two ways. ‘Among 
white evangelical Christians, Obama had 40% fewer votes 
than McCain.’ or ‘Among white evangelical Christians, 
McCain had 40% more votes than Obama.’ Focusing on why 
Obama had fewer votes than McCain may result in a different 
explanation from focusing on why McCain had more votes 
than Obama, although it is the same fact. Thus what 
determines whether we focus in our explanation on Obama or 
McCain?  
In two studies, we show that people generally focused more 
on the first part of the comparative fact. However, when the 
comparative fact is presented in a negative frame (‘less … 
than’) there was a shift in focus from the first to the second 
part of the fact. For neutral items this moderating effect did 
not occur. The Principle of Lexical Marking (Clark, 1969) 
and Loss Aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) are 
discussed as possible accounts for this shift in focus. 
 
Keywords: Explanation; Reasoning; Mental Representation 
The focus of explanations 
Absolute judgments are often more difficult than relative 
judgments (Laming, 1984; Miller, 1956; Stewart, Brown, & 
Chater, 2005). Evaluating whether the price of a new roof is 
expensive or not is more difficult than judging whether one 
quote is better value than another. As an aid, we often 
present facts in a comparative manner. The severity of the 
financial crisis in the UK, for instance, is seldom presented 
by itself but rather in comparison with other nations (the US 
or other European nations) or with previous crises. 
Advertisers use comparisons to highlight key features of 
their products in order to make a favorable evaluation easy 
to form.  
The advantage of a contrast or comparison is not, 
however, restricted to judgments. It has also been argued 
that explanations for contrasts are in some circumstances 
easier than those for plain facts (Lipton, 2004). In line with 
Mill’s Method of difference (Mill, 1862/2006), contrastive 
explanations explain a fact by highlighting the causal 
difference between the case to be explained and the 
otherwise similar case in which the fact does not hold 
(McGill, 1993). For instance, the severity of the financial 
crisis in Britain might be easier to explain by comparing it 
to that of the rest of Europe and finding differences between 
the nations that might account for it.  
Unlike this example where the target of the explanation 
(the severity of the financial crisis in Britain) is apparent, 
there are cases where describing a comparative fact leaves 
open which part of the fact needs to be explained. Stating 
that, among white evangelical Christians, Obama had 40% 
fewer votes than McCain leaves open whether one needs to 
explain the appeal of McCain or the disapproval of Obama 
among those voters. Focusing on one or the other may result 
in a different explanation for the same fact.  
Previous research has looked at this problem in terms of 
stereotyping (Grier & McGill, 2000), group typicality 
(Hegarty & Pratto, 2001) and Norm Theory (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986). For instance, Miller, Taylor, & Buck (1991) 
observed that gender differences in voting behavior in the 
1988 US election seemed to be exclusively explained in 
terms of women’s voting patterns. In line with Norm 
Theory, they argued that men are considered the 
stereotypical voter and therefore the norm, whereas women 
are the more mutable voting group whose behavior could 
more easily change. Hence the explanations of the 
difference in voting patterns focused more on the ‘deviant’ 
behavior of women. To support their hypothesis, they asked 
people to explain differences in the number of doctor-visits 
that men and women in stereotypically male or female 
professions have in a year. The results revealed that 
explanations of a gender difference among University 
Professors focused more on women whereas the same 
difference among Elementary School Teacher was 
explained more in terms of men. 
In contrast, Hegarty and Pratto (2001) have argued that 
the focus in explanations is not solely due to the mutability 
of one of the two groups’ behavior but rather due to the 
groups’ typicality within the relevant superordinate 
category. They asked participants for explanations of group 
differences between heterosexual and homosexual men in 
compliance with a treatment and found that people generally 
focused more on the characteristics of homosexual men. 
However when they changed the overarching treatment 
category from cancer to AIDS they found roughly equally 
many references to each group. They also showed that 
relative group size influenced who is considered the norm 
and as a result who is focused on. Furthermore they did not 
find any correlation of these effects with the mutability of 
the two groups. The behavior of homosexual men was 
consistently considered to be more mutable than that of 
heterosexual men.  
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Thus Hegarty and Pratto (2001) argued that rather than 
mutability, it is the typicality and size of the group that 
determines who is focused on in the explanation.  
Present research 
The above studies have highlighted some key aspects that 
influence what we focus on in our explanations—be it 
mutability of one of the groups, relative group sizes or 
typicality within an overarching group. In replicating one of 
the previous studies (Miller et al., 1991), we discovered two 
basic aspects of comparative facts that influence what we 
focus on in our explanations. These effects are important 
because they are more general than mutability, typicality 
and group size and therefore apply in cases where the others 
may not hold. To our knowledge these influences on the 
focus of explanations have not been reported before.  
Experiment 1 
The aim of the first experiment was to replicate Miller et 
al.’s (1991) study using adapted stimuli while addressing a 
methodological issue. The results of their study showed an 
overall main effect towards focusing on women in the 
explanation of doctor-visits. They attributed this effect to a 
high proportion of explanations that made reference to 
gynecological issues. Thus in Experiment 1 of the present 
study, doctor-visits were replaced with dentist-visits to 
counteract this bias. In addition, we extended the 
experiment by using an additional pair of professions 
(Football player & Ballet dancer) and including typical as 
well as neutral characteristics for each career.  
Method 
Participants 242 students at City University, London, (172 
female) participated in the study. Participants volunteered or 
received course credits in return for participation.1 
 
Materials Participants were asked to explain four facts. The 
facts were presented as findings of a large-scale study from 
a renowned research institute. Each fact described a 
difference between males and females on either a typical or 
neutral attribute for either a female- (Elementary school 
teacher / Ballet dancer) or male-dominated profession 
(Professor / Football player). Two facts were about 
professions in a teaching career whereas the other two were 
about professions in a sports career. The two neutral facts 
were number of Dentist-visits for the teaching careers and 
Cinema-visits for the sport careers whereas the typical 
attributes were the Communication skills for the teaching 
careers and Ambition for the sports careers. 
Thus we had four professions with two attributes each. 
For each attribute by profession combination there were 
                                                           
1 An unequal distribution of male participants across the various 
conditions due to the relatively small sample size made an 
evaluation of the influence of gender on the focus of the 
explanations impossible. 
four conditions, here illustrated with the Football–Ambition 
item: 
– Professional female football players are more ambitious than 
professional male football players.  
– Professional female football players are less ambitious than 
professional male football players.  
– Professional male football players are more ambitious than 
professional female football players.  
– Professional male football players are less ambitious than 
professional female football players.  
Each participant saw four facts, one of each of these four 
conditions rotated across the four professions each with one 
of the four attributes according to career path.  
Thus there was a total of 64 possible stimuli derived from 
four conditions rotated across four professions with two 
types of attributes (typical vs. atypical) each. 
Three-page booklets were created with the first page 
containing the instructions and a consent form. Each of the 
subsequent pages contained two facts. Below each fact were 
four empty lines for participant to write down their 
explanations. The order of the four facts was randomized 
with the constraint that neither facts for the same career path 
nor attributes of the same type appeared on the same page.  
 
Procedure The study was conducted in group-sessions and 
participants took no longer than five minutes to complete 
the questionnaire. 
 
Pretest Forty-eight (33 female) City University students 
completed a pretest to determine both typical and neutral 
attributes for each profession and verify their gender 
stereotypes. For each profession participants were asked to 
imagine a particular person in as much detail as possible. 
They were then asked to provide typicality ratings for nine 
attributes (three of each type of attribute: typical, atypical 
and neutral). After having provided typicality ratings for 
four pairs of professions (Flight attendant – Pilot, Nurse – 
Doctor, Ballet dancer – Football player, Elementary school 
teacher – University Professor), they were asked again to 
imagine a person in each profession, answer three filler 
questions and indicate either the gender or the name of the 
person they imagined to determine the gender stereotype. 
No differences were observed between these two ways of 
measuring the gender stereotype. 
The Ballet dancer – Football player pairing showed the 
strongest stereotyping with 92% and 98% respectively 
confirming the stereotype. The Professor – Elementary 
school teacher pair was the second strongest in stereotyping 
with 90% and 85% confirming the stereotype. For each 
profession pair we chose the attribute with the highest 
average typicality rating as well as the one closest to the mid 
point.  
Results 
Coding Analysis Of the total of 968 possible explanations 
across the 242 participants, 42 explanations were missing or 
incomplete. Two independent judges coded the remaining 
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explanations as either overall focusing on male or female 
characteristics. A further 12 explanations could not be coded 
as they did not contain a reference to a specific gender (e.g. 
“this is probably due to individual differences in this 
profession” or “I think this may be caused by gender 
socialisation processes”). The two judges had an agreement 
of just under 94% with Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater reliability 
of .9. Consensus was found through discussion. 
 
 
Figure 1: The influence of Gender on the focus of 
explanations. 
 
Influence of Gender Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
explanations that made overall more reference to female 
characteristics. Each graph presents the profession pair for 
one of the two career paths across the two types of attribute. 
For both career paths, most explanations for stereotypically 
female jobs focused on men, whereas the reverse was true 
for explanations of attributes for stereotypically male jobs. 
Separate Chi-square analyses for each career path by 
attribute type inferentially supported these findings (see 
Table 1)2. This effect seemed to be somewhat weaker for 
neutral attributes than for typical attributes. However 
exploratory hierarchical loglinear analysis showed the effect 
to be constant across attribute types (χ2(1, N = 912) = 1.03, 
p = .31) and career paths (χ2(1, N = 912) = .24, p = .62).  
 
Table 1: Chi-Square results for each attribute. 
 
Attribute Chi-Square 
C-skills χ2(1, N = 227) = 8.58, p < .01 
Dentist-visits χ2(1, N = 230) = 4.99, p < .05 
Ambition χ2(1, N = 234) = 17.4, p < .01 
Cinema-visits χ2(1, N = 221) = 5.48, p < .05 
 
Influence of Position & Frame In addition to the influence 
of Gender, the data revealed that in 66% of the explanations 
people intuitively focused more on the group mentioned 
first in the fact (e.g., “Profession male football players are 
more ambitious than profession female football players.”). 
This effect was independent of whether the profession was 
stereotypically male or female and the same across items 
(χ2(1, N = 912) = 90.9, p < .001).  
However this bias towards focusing on the first part of the 
fact was moderated for some items by the way the fact was 
framed. Based on the odds ratio, framing a fact about a 
typical attribute in terms of ‘less … than’ (47%/53%) made 
it 5 times less likely that the explanation would focus on the 
first part of the fact than when it was framed as ‘more … 
than’ (82%/18%). For neutral attributes the framing did not 
influence the bias toward the first part of the fact (see 
Figure 2). Separate Chi-Square analyses for typical and 
neutral attributes confirmed that the bias interacted with the 
way the fact was framed for typical attributes 
(χ2(1, N = 461) = 60.1, p < .01) but not for neutral attributes 
(χ2(1, N = 451) = .7, p = .42).  
 
Figure 2: The influence of Frame and Typicality on the 
focus of explanations. 
                                                           
2 Separating the analyses by items was necessary to ensure 
independence of cells. 
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Discussion 
The results showed that for explanations of comparative 
facts people tended to focus on the less stereotypical 
member of the group, corroborating Miller et al. ’s  (1991) 
findings. Explaining a gender difference among members of 
a stereotypically male profession, most people pay more 
attention to the characteristics of female members, whereas 
the reverse was true for a stereotypically female profession.  
Unlike Miller et al. (1991) however, we found that people 
intuitively paid more attention in their explanation to the 
group mentioned first. People tended to focus more on male 
football players when males were mentioned first and 
female ballet dancers when females were mentioned first 
despite the fact that they are the stereotypical group for each 
profession. In addition this bias towards focusing on the first 
part was moderated in typical attributes by the way the fact 
was framed. Thus when the fact was presented as ‘less … 
than’ (e.g., “Professional female football players are less 
ambitious than professional male football players”) a larger 
proportion of people focused on the second group than 
when it was presented as ‘more … than’.  
To our knowledge this effect of framing in the realm of 
explanation has not been reported before. It represents an 
important finding because it shows that one can change 
what people pay attention to in their explanation by simply 
changing the way the to-be-explained fact is framed. 
Presenting Hilary Clinton as more liberal than Obama may 
elicit different explanations than presenting her as less 
conservative than Obama.  
What is interesting about our data is that, although fairly 
strong for typical attributes (one is 5 times more likely to 
focus on the first part of the fact when the attribute is 
framed as ‘more … than’ than when it is framed as ‘less … 
than’), the framing effect did not occur for neutral attributes. 
For neutral items there was a constant bias towards 
explaining the first part of the comparative fact.  
What is the difference between being more or less 
ambitious and going more or less often to the cinema that 
makes the framing effect appear in the former but not the 
latter case? We termed the attributes as typical and neutral 
in regards to the different professions. However one might 
also consider them as positive and neutral. Being ambitious 
as a sports-professional and having good communication 
skills in a teaching profession are positive attributes, 
whereas the number of dentist- and cinema-visits do not 
really have either a positive or negative connotation in 
relation to either profession. If the typical attributes are 
perceived as positive, then a ‘less … than’ frame would be 
considered negative for the target group. Comparative facts 
have the characteristic that makes it possible to turn the 
negative frame for one group into a positive frame for the 
other group. Male footballer being less ambitious than 
female footballer means that the women are more ambitious 
than their male counterparts. Thus our data suggest that 
some people avoid focusing on the negative framing of a 
positive attribute and instead turn their attention to the 
positive framing of the attribute for the comparison group. 
This shift in focus only occurred for attributes that have a 
positive valence. It did not occur for attributes that are 
neutral in valence. People did not avoid focusing on the 
‘less … than’ frame of neutral attributes like going to the 
cinema. 
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was primarily to replicate the 
finding that both the position and the way the fact is framed 
influence what we focus on in our explanations. A 
secondary purpose was to validate a new procedure in the 
testing process. Previous research including Experiment 1 
used two independent judges to code the explanations. Here 
we asked participants, after having provided their 
explanation, to go through their explanation and evaluate 
whether the reasoning in their explanation was more about 
one or the other group presented in the comparison. This 
procedure avoids difficulties of interpretation in the coding 
stage and was more time-efficient.  
Method 
Participants 397 (55 male) students from the Catholic 
University, Leuven, participated in the study in return for 
course credits.  
 
Design A between subjects design was used with Item topic 
(Sports vs. Politics), Item (Footballer vs. Ballet dancer or 
Liberal vs. Conservative), Frame (More vs. Less), and 
Position (whether Males or Females / Professor or Teachers 
constitute the first part of the fact) as factors. For the sports 
profession we adopted the typical attribute of Experiment 1 
(ambition). The political items compared Professors with 
Teachers on either being liberal or conservative3.  
Two dependent variables were used. The first reflected 
the degree to which the explanation focused on one or the 
other option on an 11-point scale with each end representing 
one of the two comparison groups. The second measured the 
overall focus in the explanation as a forced choice. 
 
Materials Participants were asked to provide an explanation 
for one particular fact. The fact was again presented as a 
finding of a large-scale study from a renowned research 
institute. Each fact was either about a gender difference in 
sports professions (Football or Ballet) or a difference in 
political attitude (being liberal or conservative) between 
teachers and professors. As in Experiment 1 each fact could 
take one of four forms depending on the Position (which 
group constituted the first part of the fact) and the Frame 
(‘more … than’ or ‘less … than’). The position of the two 
comparison groups on the rating scale and the forced choice 
options were counterbalanced. The items for Sports were 
therefore identical to those from Study 1.  
 
                                                           
3 Note that for the political item people were asked to explain a 
difference between teachers and professors rather than between 
genders. 
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Procedure The study was conducted as part of a series of 
studies. Participants took part in groups of 25 and required 
no more than 3 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Each 
participant provided one explanation for a comparative fact 
and subsequently rated that explanation for the degree to 
which the explanation focused on one or the other 
component of the fact. In addition, participants gave an 
overall judgment of their focus in their explanation. 
Results 
Influence of Gender First we looked at the effect of gender 
stereotyping on the focus in explanations in the sports 
profession items in order to validate the procedure of 
Experiment 2. Overall only 39% of explanations regarding a 
gender difference among ballet dancers focused on women 
whereas for football players it was 53% (χ2(1, N = 193) = 
3.96, p < .05). Thus the data for sports professions 
replicated the influence of gender stereotyping on who 
received most attention in explanations.  
 
Influence of Position & Frame In order to test the 
influence of Position and Frame on the overall judgment of 
focus, a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 hierarchical loglinear analysis was 
carried out with Item topic (Sports vs. Politics), Item 
(Male/Professor vs. Female/Teacher), Position (e.g., 
Professor-First vs. Teacher-First) and Frame (more vs. less) 
as independent variables. As in Experiment 1, we found an 
overall preference to explain the first part of the fact (65% 
of people; χ2(1, N = 374) = 32.4, p < .001). This bias was 
again moderated by the way the attribute was framed with 
81% focusing on the first part when it was framed as ‘more 
... than’ and only 49% focusing on the first when it was 
framed as ‘less ... than’ (χ2(1, N = 374) = 41.2, p < .001). 
Figure 3 illustrates that this moderating effect on the bias 
was not equally strong for all items. Similar to the neutral 
items in Experiment 1, the moderating effect of the Frame 
was smaller for explanations about why professors and 
teachers have different levels of conservatism. This was 
reflected in a significant interaction between Item topic, 
Item and Frame on the proportion of people focusing on the 
first part of the explanation (χ2(1, N = 374) = 4.7, p < .05).  
The dependent measure reflecting the degree to which an 
explanation focused on one or the other group matched the 
forced choice option. The degree to which people focused 
on the first part of the explanation was significantly above 
the mid point of the scale on a one-sample t-test (M = 5.9, 
SD = 3.1, t(373) = 5.9, p < .001). An Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with the degree of focus on the first part as 
dependent variable and Item topic, Item, Position and Frame 
as between-subjects factors revealed a significant main 
effect of Frame (F(1, 358) = 22.1, p < .001) reflecting the 
moderating effect of Frame on the bias towards focusing on 
the first part of the fact. 4 
                                                           
4 None of the effects reported here were influenced by the 
participants’ gender. 
 
 
Figure 3: The interaction between Item topic, Item and 
Frame on the focus of explanations. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the effect of gender stereotyping in 
the sports profession items and thereby validated the change 
in procedure. Using external judges or asking participants to 
do their own coding did not affect the results. The data also 
replicated the influence of Position and Frame on the focus 
of the explanations. People again focused more on the first 
part of the comparative fact, which was moderated by the 
way the attribute was framed. This moderating effect 
however was only present in the sports profession items and 
the liberal attribute of the political items. Although the data 
showed a similar pattern for the conservative attribute, the 
moderating effect of Frame was not significant.  
Although being liberal or conservative were assumed to 
be roughly of the same valence, the data for the conservative 
attribute behaved in a similar way as the neutral items in 
Experiment 1. In a sample of 29 students from the Catholic 
University of Leuven, the majority judged being liberal as a 
positive (19/29) whereas being conservative a neutral 
(18/29) characteristic. Thus people avoided focusing on the 
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negatively framed attribute for the target group and rather 
explained the positive characteristic of the comparison 
group. In contrast participants did not avoid focusing on the 
‘less … than’ frame when the attribute was more neutral.  
Experiment 2 therefore provides additional evidence that 
the shift in focus occurs for positively valenced rather than 
neutral attributes. In hindsight, however, our data do not 
entirely rule out the influence of the typicality of the 
attribute for the group. Participants may well perceive being 
liberal as a more typical attribute for Professors and 
Elementary school teachers. This possibility will have to be 
addressed in future studies. 
General Discussion 
Facts are often presented in relative terms by comparing one 
case with another. This helps both in evaluating the fact 
(Laming, 1984; Stewart et al., 2005) and in finding possible 
explanations for the fact (Lipton, 2004). Presenting a fact in 
a comparative manner offers at least two ways to present the 
fact. We can, for instance, present the financial crisis in 
Britain as more severe than in the rest of Europe or we can 
present the financial crisis in Europe as less severe than that 
in Britain. Our results suggest that these two ways of 
presenting the same fact changes what people focus on in 
their explanation and hence changes their explanation.  
The Principle of Lexical Marking (Clark, 1969) may 
provide an explanation for the shift in focus. This principle 
suggests that for pairs of adjectival terms (high-low, bright-
dim, etc.) one of the terms is represented in a less complex 
form in our semantic memory than the other. The so-called 
unmarked term is the one that defines the scale (e.g., height, 
brightness). It is also noncommittal. Asking ‘how high is the 
bridge?’ leaves open whether the bridge is high or low, 
whereas ‘how low is it?’ implies that it is low. In a 
comparative question like ‘Why was Obama less popular 
with evangelical Christian voters than McCain’, people 
might focus more on McCain being more popular because 
‘being popular’ is the unmarked term on a popularity scale. 
If ‘being less’ popular is represented in a more complex 
form, takes longer to process (Clark, 1969) and may 
therefore be more difficult to explain, it is understandable 
that people would think about the flipside of the coin and 
explain the greater popularity of McCain. If lexical marking 
was the complete story though, one might expect the shift in 
focus not to be restricted to positively valenced attributes. 
Although loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is 
mainly a theory about subjective utility, it may be useful in 
thinking about why this effect seems to be restricted to 
valenced attributes. Negative events appear to mobilize 
physiological, affective, cognitive, and certain types of 
social resources to a greater degree than do positive or 
neutral events (Kusev et al., 2008). For a negatively 
presented difference, participants might therefore not restrict 
their efforts to providing an explanation for the target group, 
but also consider the comparison group. This would explain 
the differential effect of neutral and positive attributes on 
the shift in focus.  
Previous research has suggested several factors that may 
influence what we focus on in our explanation (Grier & 
McGill, 2000; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Miller et al., 1991). 
Here we have shown that over and above those influences, 
there are also influences on the more fundamental level of 
presentation. Future research will have to scrutinize possible 
theories—including lexical marking and loss aversion—that 
can account for this shift in focus. Here we have provided a 
first demonstration of this effect in the realm of 
explanations.  
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